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1 
Abstract 
 
 
The employment problems that the United States now faces are largely structural. The 
structural problem is not, however, as many economists have argued, a labor-market 
mismatch between the skills that prospective employers want and the skills that potential 
workers have. Rather the employment problem is rooted in changes in the ways that U.S. 
corporations employ workers as a result of "rationalization", "marketization", and 
"globalization". From the early 1980s rationalization, characterized by plant closings, 
eliminated the jobs of unionized blue-collar workers. From the early 1990s 
marketization, characterized by the end of a career with one company as an employment 
norm, placed the job security of middle-aged and older white-collar workers in jeopardy. 
From the early 2000s globalization, characterized by the movement of employment 
offshore, left all members of the U.S. labor force, even those with advanced educational 
credentials and substantial work experience, vulnerable to displacement. Nevertheless, 
the disappearance of these existing middle-class jobs does not explain why, in a world of 
technological change, U.S. business corporations have failed to use their substantial 
profits to invest in new rounds of innovation that can create enough new high value-
added jobs to replace those that have been lost. I attribute that organizational failure to 
the financialization of the U.S. corporation. The most obvious manifestation of 
financialization is the phenomenon of the stock buyback, with which major U.S. 
corporations seek to manipulate the market prices of their own shares. For the decade 
2001-2010 the companies in the S&P 500 Index expended about $3 trillion on stock 
buybacks. The prime motivation for stock buybacks is the stock-based pay of the 
corporate executives who make these allocation decisions. The justification for stock 
buybacks is the erroneous ideology, inherited from the conventional theory of the market 
economy, that, for superior economic performance, companies should be run to 
"maximize shareholder value". In this essay I summarize the damage that this ideology 
is doing to the U.S. economy, and I lay out a policy agenda for restoring equitable and 
stable economic growth.  
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What Happened to Economic Prosperity? 
 
Many of us know what a prosperous economy looks like. People who want to work have 
no problem finding jobs. People who want to build careers can accumulate the necessary 
work experience over time. People who want to start their own businesses can tap into 
sources of committed finance that can enable them to get their firms up and running. 
When the work has been done, careers have been built, and businesses have become 
going concerns, the prosperous economy yields a distribution of income that most 
people regard as fair. The prosperous economy has a large and stable middle class, with 
hard-working and dedicated people finding opportunities to climb up the economic 
ladder. The intergenerational expectation is that children will do better than their parents. 
And, after several decades of remunerative work, their parents can retire with enough 
savings to remain at least middle class for the rest of their lives. 
 
Many of us know what a prosperous economy looks like because, for people who are old 
enough to remember, it is what the U.S. economy used to be. For most college-educated 
people that type of economy existed as recently as the 1990s, while for most high-
school-educated people it disappeared a decade or two before that.  More generally, the 
past 30 years or so have seen an unrelenting disappearance of middle-class jobs 
accompanied by ever-growing economic inequality with an increasingly extreme 
concentration of income and wealth among a very small number of people at the top. As 
the Occupy Wall Street movement has recognized, the prosperity of the top “1%” is the 
antithetical to a prosperous U.S. economy. 
 
As the U.S. economy still struggles to recover from the Great Recession, the erosion of 
middle-class jobs and the explosion of income inequality have endured long enough to 
raise serious questions about whether the economy is beset by deep structural problems. 
My research on the evolution of the U.S. economy over the past half century shows that 
such is indeed the case (see Lazonick 2009a, 2009c; 2010a; 2012). Since the beginning 
of the 1980s employment relations in U.S. industrial corporations have undergone three 
major structural changes – which I summarize as “rationalization”, “marketization”, and 
“globalization” – that have permanently eliminated middle-class jobs. From the early 
1980s rationalization, characterized by plant closings, eliminated the jobs of unionized 
blue-collar workers. From the early 1990s marketization, characterized by the end of a 
career with one company as an employment norm, placed the job security of middle-
aged and older white-collar workers in jeopardy. From the early 2000s globalization, 
characterized by the movement of employment offshore, left all members of the U.S. 
labor force, even those with advanced educational credentials and substantial work 
experience, vulnerable to displacement.  
 
Initially, each of these structural changes in employment could be justified in terms of 
major changes in industrial conditions related to technologies, markets, and competition. 
In the early 1980s the plant closings that characterized rationalization were a response to 
the superior productive capabilities of Japanese competitors in consumer durable and 
related capital-goods industries that employed significant numbers of unionized blue-
collar workers. In the early 1990s the erosion of the one-company-career norm among 
white-collar workers that characterized marketization was a response to the dramatic 
technological shift from proprietary systems to open systems that was integral to the 
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microelectronics revolution. In the early 2000s the acceleration in the offshoring of the 
jobs of well-educated and highly experienced members of the U.S. labor force that 
characterized globalization was a response to the emergence of large supplies of highly 
capable labor in lower-wage developing nations such as China and India.   
 
Once U.S. corporations adopted these structural changes in employment, however, they 
often pursued these employment strategies purely for financial gain. Some companies 
closed manufacturing plants, terminated experienced (and generally more expensive) 
workers, and offshored production to low-wage areas of the world simply to increase 
profits, often at the expense of the company’s long-term competitive capabilities and 
without regard for displaced employees’ long years of service. Moreover, as these 
changes became embedded in the structure of U.S. employment, business corporations 
failed to invest in new, higher value-added job creation on a sufficient scale to provide a 
foundation for equitable and stable growth in the U.S. economy.  
 
On the contrary, with superior corporate performance defined as meeting Wall Street’s 
expectations for quarterly earnings per share, major companies turned to massive stock 
repurchases to “manage” their own corporations’ stock prices. Trillions of dollars that 
could have been spent on innovation and job creation in the U.S. economy over the past 
three decades have instead been used to buy back stock for the purpose of manipulating 
the company’s stock price. Legitimizing this “financialized” mode of corporate resource 
allocation has been the ideology, itself a product of the 1980s and 1990s, that a business 
corporation should be run to “maximize shareholder value” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000; Lazonick 2012a). Through their stock-based compensation, corporate executives 
who make these resource-allocation decisions are themselves prime beneficiaries of this 
focus on rising stock prices as the measure of corporate performance. 
 
My argument is that the employment problems that the United States now faces are 
largely structural. The structural problem is not, however, as many economists have 
argued, a labor-market mismatch between the skills that prospective employers want and 
the skills that potential workers have. Rather the employment problem is rooted in 
changes in the ways that U.S. corporations employ workers as a result of rationalization, 
marketization, and globalization. Nevertheless, the disappearance of these existing 
middle-class jobs does not explain why, in a world of technological change, U.S. 
business corporations have failed to use their substantial profits to invest in new rounds 
of innovation that can create enough new high value-added jobs to replace those that 
have been lost. I attribute that organizational failure to the financialization of the U.S. 
corporation. 
 
In the next section of this essay, I summarize the evidence that supports the proposition 
that there have been fundamental structural changes in employment in the United States 
that since the early 1980s have eroded middle-class employment opportunities for the 
U.S. labor force. Then I present the evidence that over the same period the remuneration 
of top executives of both industrial and financial corporations has been a major reason 
for the increasing concentration of income at the top. In the following sections I show 
that stock buybacks have became a massive and systemic way in which these corporate 
executives seek to boost their companies’ stock prices, and hence, via stock-based 
compensation, their own incomes. Then I point out how, in many different ways in many 
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different industries, this financialized mode of corporate resource allocation has 
undermined the prosperity of the U.S. economy. I conclude this essay by identifying the 
types of changes in the institutional and ideological environment of the United States 
that are needed to put the nation back on a path to sustainable prosperity.  
 
The Disappearance of Middle-Class Jobs 
 
During the post-World War II decades, for both blue-collar and white-collar workers, 
the norm in large, established U.S. business corporations was career employment with 
one company. When layoffs occurred, they tended to be temporary and, in unionized 
workplaces, on a last-hired, first-fired basis. Supported by a highly progressive income 
tax system, countercyclical government fiscal policy sought to reduce the severity of 
business fluctuations, while employment generated by government spending, 
particularly on higher education, healthcare, advanced technology and physical 
infrastructure (for example, the interstate highway system), complemented the 
employment opportunities provided by the business sector. The result was relatively 
equitable and stable economic growth from the late 1940s to the beginning of the 1970s 
(Lazonick 2009a, chs. 1 and 3). 
 
From the late 1970s, however, in industries that had been central to U.S. innovation, 
employment, and growth, U.S. corporations faced formidable Japanese competition. The 
Japanese challenge came in industries such as automobiles, consumer electronics, 
machine tools, steel, and microelectronics in which the United States had been a world 
leader. The critical source of Japan’s competitive advantage over the United States was 
“organizational integration”; through the hierarchical integration of shop-floor workers 
and the functional integration of technical specialists into processes of organizational 
learning, the Japanese perfected, and outcompeted, the U.S. Old Economy business 
model (Lazonick 1998 and 2010a). Even though unionized blue-collar workers in the 
United States had a high degree of job security in the post-World War II decades, they 
had historically been excluded from the processes of organizational learning within the 
corporation, reflecting a uniquely American hierarchical segmentation between 
“management” and “labor” (Lazonick 1990).  
 
In sharp contrast, the hierarchical integration of shop-floor workers into the 
organizational learning processes that generated higher quality, lower cost products was 
the prime source of Japanese competitive advantage. Complementing this hierarchical 
integration, the collaboration of Japanese technical specialists in solving productivity 
problems in manufacturing encouraged the functional integration of their skills and 
efforts, again in contrast to the relatively high degree of functional segmentation of 
technical specialists in the United States. In sum, it was a more powerful system of 
organizational learning that enabled the Japanese to outcompete the Americans. 
 
The particular impacts of Japanese competition varied markedly across U.S. industries. 
It virtually wiped out the U.S.-based consumer electronics industry. For example, in 
1981 RCA was one of the leading consumer electronics companies in the world, and the 
44th largest U.S. industrial company by revenues with employment of 119,000. By 1986 
it had been taken over by General Electric and sold off in pieces (Chandler 2001, chs. 2 
and 3). During the 1980s U.S. automobile manufacturers attempted to learn from the 
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Japanese, but three decades later the U.S. companies were still producing lower quality, 
higher cost cars, and, not surprisingly, had lost significant market share (Platzer and 
Harrison 2009). In the machine tool industry, the overwhelming success of the Japanese 
against the major U.S. companies was followed from the 1990s by the emergence of 
export-oriented small- and medium-sized enterprises producing for specialized niche 
markets (Kalafsky and MacPherson 2002). In the steel industry, the innovative response 
of the United States was the emergence of independent minimills, using electric arc 
furnaces and scrap metal, as distinct from the traditional vertically integrated mills that 
converted iron ore into crude steel before making finished products. In the 1980s the 
minimills only had the technological capability to manufacture long products such as 
bars and rails, but, led by Nucor, the introduction of compact strip production 
technology from 1989 enabled the minimills to compete with integrated mills in flat 
products such as bars and sheets as well (Giarratani et al. 2007).   
 
The most perilous, but ultimately successful, U.S. response to Japanese competition was 
in the semiconductor industry. By the middle of the 1980s, the Japanese had used their 
integrated skill bases to lower defects and raise yields in the production of memory chips. 
This competition forced major U.S. semiconductor companies to retreat from this 
segment of the market, with Intel facing the possibility of bankruptcy in the process 
(Burgelman 1994; Okimoto and Nishi 1994). Led by Intel and its microprocessor for the 
IBM PC and its clones, however, U.S. companies became world leaders in chip design. 
Indeed, the IBM PC, with its open systems architecture, laid the basis for the rise of a 
“New Economy business model” with rationalization, marketization, and globalization 
of employment in its DNA (Lazonick 2009a and 2009c).  
 
The adverse impact of Japanese competition on U.S. employment became particularly 
harsh in the double-dip recession of 1980-1982 when large numbers of good blue-collar 
jobs disappeared from U.S. industry, as it turned out permanently (Bednarzik 1983). 
Previously, in a more stable competitive environment, U.S. manufacturing companies 
would lay off workers with the least seniority in a downturn and re-employ them when 
economic conditions improved. In the 1980s it became commonplace for companies 
were much more likely to shutter whole plants (Harris 1984; Hamermesh 1989). From 
1980 to 1985 employment in the U.S. economy increased from 104.5 million to 107.2 
million workers, or by 2.6 percent. But employment of operators, fabricators, and 
laborers fell from 20.0 million to 16.8 million, a decline of 15.9 percent (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1983, 416; and 1986, 386).  
 
As Daniel Hamermesh (1989, 53) summed it up: “Each year during the eighties, plant 
closings in the U.S. displaced roughly one-half million workers with three-plus years on 
the job.” Over the course of the 1980s the stock market came to react favorably to 
permanent downsizings of the blue-collar labor force (Abowd et al. 1990; Palmon et al. 
1997). As secure middle-class jobs for high-school-educated blue-collar workers 
permanently disappeared, there was no commitment on the part of those who managed 
U.S. industrial corporations or the Republican administrations that ruled in the 1980s to 
invest in the new capabilities and opportunities required to upgrade the quality and 
expand the quantity of well-paid employment opportunities in the United States on a 
scale sufficient to reestablish conditions of prosperity for these displaced members of the 
U.S. labor force. 
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Among blue-collar workers, African-Americans were extremely hard hit by the 
rationalization of employment in the 1980s. They were overrepresented in the Old 
Economy manufacturing sectors such as steel, autos, and consumer electronics that were 
in decline and underrepresented in the New Economy sectors related to the 
microelectronics revolution that were on the rise. Besides losing jobs when plants were 
closed, many blacks had recently moved into unionized jobs so that when some workers 
in an establishment were laid off, they tended to have been the last hired and hence were 
the first fired (see Kletzer 1991; Sharpe 1993; Fairlie and Kletzer 1998). As William 
Julius Wilson (1996-1997) argued, the disappearance of these middle-class jobs had 
devastating impacts on the abilities and incentives of blacks to accumulate the education 
and experience required to position themselves for the types of well-paid and stable 
employment opportunities that remained. 
 
In historical retrospect we now know that the recoveries that followed the recessions of 
1990-1991, 2001, and 2007-2009 were “jobless”. Technically, the recovery from the 
recessionary conditions of 1980-1982 was not “jobless” because employment 
opportunities created by the microelectronics boom in the first half of the 1980s offset 
the joblessness that remained in the traditional manufacturing sector as the U.S. 
economy began to grow. For example, from 1980 to 1985 employment of mathematical 
and computer engineers increased from 330,000 to 571,000, or by 73.0 percent, and 
employment of computer programmers increased from 318,000 to 534,000, or by 67.9 
percent (U.S. Department of Commerce 1983, 416; and 1986, 385). In the expansion of 
1983-1985, however, workers in traditional manufacturing industries, who typically held 
high-school diplomas, experienced the first of four jobless recoveries of the last three 
decades. 
 
As for the New Economy, the recovery from the recession of 1980-1982 saw the 
emergence of the Wintel architecture around the IBM PC (Borrus and Zysman 1997). In 
1982 IBM’s PC sales were $500 million. Just two years later IBM’s PC sales had soared 
to 11 times that amount, more than triple the 1984 revenues of Apple, its nearest 
competitor, and about equal to the revenues of IBM’s top eight rivals. Subsequently, the 
very success of the IBM PC combined with open access to the Microsoft operating 
system and Intel microprocessor meant that, in the last half of the 1980s and beyond, 
IBM lost market share to lower priced PC clones produced by New Economy companies 
such as Compaq, Gateway, and Dell (Chandler 2001, 118–119, 142–143). Competition 
on the basis of open systems had become the norm (Chesbrough 2006). 
 
With the microelectronics revolution of the 1980s, New Economy companies in the 
information and communication technology (ICT) industries found themselves in 
competition for professional, technical, and administrative labor with Old Economy ICT 
companies such as Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Motorola, Texas Instruments, and Xerox that, 
even in the 1980s, still offered employees the realistic prospect of a career with one 
company. As young firms facing a highly uncertain future, it was impossible for New 
Economy companies to attract labor away from Old Economy companies by promises of 
career employment. Instead the New Economy startups used the inducement of 
employee stock options to attract and retain employees, very high proportions of whom 
were college-educated. As the successful New Economy companies grew large most if 
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not all employees were partially compensated in stock options. For example, Cisco 
Systems had 250 employees in 1990, the year in which it did its initial public offering 
(IPO). A decade later, after it had come to dominate the Internet router market, it had 
over 34,000 employees, virtually all of whom received stock options (Lazonick 2009a, 
ch. 2).  
 
So that stock options would perform a retention function as well as an attraction function, 
the practice evolved in New Economy firms of making option grants annually, with the 
vesting period for any annual block of option grants being 25 percent of the grants at the 
end of each of the first four years after the grant date. Once the options are vested, they 
can typically be exercised for a period of 10 years from the grant date, so long as one 
remains with the company. Without creating the Old Economy expectation among 
employees of lifelong careers with the company, the perpetual pipeline of unvested 
options functions as a tangible retention mechanism. Indeed, for most employees, the 
amount of options that an individual can expect to receive is tied to his or her position in 
the firm’s hierarchical and functional division of labor, so that the retention function of 
stock options is integrally related to the employee’s career progress within the particular 
company (Lazonick 2009a, chs. 2 and 4). 
 
An Old Economy company valued career employees because they had experience in the 
development and utilization of the company’s proprietary technologies. At many of the 
leading companies, the corporate R&D lab was the main source of this intellectual 
property. Investment in new products and processes was often done on military contracts, 
with the adaptation of the technologies to commercial production as process 
technologies improved and potential unit costs declined. As Old Economy companies, 
taken together, passed on some of their productivity gains to their employees in the 
forms of higher wages, they supported the growth of domestic mass markets on which 
they could attain high capacity utilization of their existing productive capabilities and for 
which they could develop new products. 
 
The recession and recovery of the early 1990s witnessed the marketization of the 
employment relation, and marked the beginning of the end of the career-with-one-
company norm. Although in absolute terms, blue-collar workers suffered more 
unemployment than white-collar workers during this recession, the extent to which 
professional, technical, and administrative employees were terminated was 
unprecedented in the post-World War II decades (Eberts and Groshen 1991; Gardner 
1994). Hence the downturn of 1990-1991 is known as a “white-collar recession”. 
Increasingly over the course of the 1990s, including during the Internet boom in the 
second half of the decade, the career-long employment security that people in their 40s 
and 50s had come to expect under the Old Economy business model vanished as 
employers replaced more expensive older workers with less expensive younger workers 
(Lazonick 2009a, chs. 3 and 7). 
 
Given its size, reputation, and central position in the ICT industries, the dramatic 
changes at IBM in the early 1990s marked a fundamental juncture in the transition from 
employment security to employment insecurity in the U.S. corporate economy. Through 
the 1980s IBM touted its practice of “lifelong employment” as a source of its 
competitive success. From 1990 to 1994, however, IBM cut employment from 373,816 
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to 219,839, reducing its labor force to only 59 percent of its year-end 1990 level. During 
this period, much of IBM’s downsizing was accomplished by making it attractive for its 
employees to accept voluntary severance packages, including early retirement at age 55. 
But in 1993 and 1994, after recruiting CEO Louis V. Gerstner, Jr. from RJR Nabisco to 
get the job done, many thousands of IBM employees were fired outright. In 1995 IBM 
rescinded the early-retirement offer that had helped downsize its labor force; the offer 
had accomplished its purpose, and in any case, IBM no longer wanted to encourage all 
employees to remain with the company even until the age of 55 (Lazonick 2009a, ch. 3). 
 
Of IBM’s losses of $15.9 billion in 1991-1993 (including an $8.1 billion deficit in 1993, 
the largest annual loss in U.S. corporate history at the time), 86 percent came from 
workforce-related restructuring charges (including the cost of employee separations and 
relocations). This loss was, in effect, the cost to the company of ridding itself of its once-
hallowed tradition of lifelong employment. Other restructuring charges, mainly for the 
consolidation of manufacturing capacity and elimination of excess space – both part and 
parcel of the massive downsizing process – amounted to $10.6 billion over the three 
years. Ignoring restructuring charges, IBM recorded positive net incomes before taxes of 
$939 million in 1991, $2,619 million in 1992, and $148 million in 1993. Although IBM 
continued to downsize at a torrid pace in 1994, most of it was done outside the United 
States and without voluntary severance provisions. During 1994 the company booked no 
restructuring charges and had after-tax profits of $3,021 million. By that time, lifelong 
employment at IBM was a thing of the past. 
 
In line with the IBM transition, for the period of 1992 to 1997, John Abowd and his co-
authors (2007) found a general shift in U.S. employment from older experienced 
workers to younger skilled workers related to the adoption of computer technologies. 
Using Current Population Survey data, Charles Schultze (1999, 10–11) discovered that 
“[m]iddle-aged and older men, for whatever reason, are not staying as long with their 
employers as they once did.” He went on to show, moreover, that the job displacement 
rate for white-collar workers relative to blue-collar workers had risen substantially in the 
1980s and 1990s, starting at 33 percent in 1981–1982 and increasing to about 80 percent 
in the 1990s. 
 
As Lori Kletzer (1998, 117) wrote in a 1998 survey article on “job displacement”:  
 
Job loss rates fell steadily from the 1981–83 rate, which encompassed the 
recession of 1981–82, through the expansion period of 1983–89. Job loss rates 
then rose again in 1989–91 as the economy weakened. The latest job loss figures 
are surprising. In the midst of a sustained (if uneven) expansion, 1993–95 job 
loss rates are the highest of the 14-year period: about 15 percent of U.S. workers 
were displaced from a job at some time during this three-year period. These high 
rates of job loss are consistent with public perceptions of rising job insecurity. 
 
In a more recent analysis of changes in job security, Henry Farber (2010, 223) stated that 
“[t]here is ample evidence that long-term employment [with one company] is on the 
decline in the United States.” Using Current Population Survey data for 1973–2006, 
Farber (2010, 230) found that  
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mean tenure for males employed in the private sector has declined substantially, 
particularly for older workers. For example, mean tenure for private sector males 
at age fifty declined from 13.5 years in the 1973 to 1983 period to 11.3 years in 
the 1996 to 2008 period. The pattern in the public sector is the opposite. For 
example, mean tenure for public sector males at age fifty increased from 13.6 
years in the 1973 to 1983 period to 15.8 years in the 1996 to 2008 period.  
 
Moreover, it appears that education as a guarantor of employment security weakened 
significantly from the 1980s to the 2000s. Using Displaced Worker Survey data to 
analyze rates of job loss, Farber (2010, 253) found that  
 
[i]n 1981 to 1983, the private-sector three-year job loss rate was 16 percent for 
high school graduates and 9.4 percent for college graduates. By 2001 to 2003 
(also a period of weak labor markets), the gap had fallen to virtually zero, with a 
private-sector three-year job loss rate of 10.7 percent for high school graduates 
and 11 percent for college graduates. Interestingly, the education gap in job loss 
rates increased in the 2005 to 2007 period with 8.3 and 10.0 percent job loss 
rates for high school and college graduates, respectively. 
 
In the 2000s globalization joined rationalization and marketization as a source of 
structural change in the employment opportunities available to members of the U.S. 
labor force. In the ICT industries that were central to the growth of the U.S. economy in 
the 1980s and 1990s, the globalization of employment dated back to the 1960s when 
U.S. semiconductor manufacturers had set up assembly and testing facilities in East 
Asia, making use of low-paid but literate female labor (Lazonick 2009a, ch. 5). Over 
time, a combination of work experience at home with both multinational and indigenous 
companies as well as the return of nationals who had acquired graduate education and/or 
work experience abroad enhanced the capabilities of the Asian labor force to engage in 
higher value-added activities. By the beginning of the 2000s Indians had become world 
leaders in the offshore provision of IT services while the Chinese had become adept in a 
wide range of manufacturing industries, especially in ICT. In the 2000s the availability 
of capable college-educated labor supplies in developing economies combined with the 
availability of high quality, low cost communications networks to enable a vast 
acceleration of the movement of jobs by U.S. companies to China and India 
(Bronfenbrenner and Luce 2004; Bednarzik 2005; Blinder 2007; Hira and Hira 2008; 
Houseman 2009).   
  
Offshoring depressed U.S. employment in the recession of 2001 and in the subsequent 
jobless recovery that stretched into 2003. As U.S.-based companies hired workers 
abroad, well-educated high-tech workers in the United States found themselves 
vulnerable to displacement (Garner 2004; Jensen and Kletzer 2005). Given huge 
increases in the issuance of non-immigrant (H-1B and L-1) work visas in the United 
States in the late 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, there were hundreds of thousands of 
high-tech workers, especially Indians, who had accumulated U.S. work experience that 
they could now take back home (Hira 2010). In February 2003, after more than a year of 
jobless recovery, BusinessWeek (Engardio et al. 2003) gained considerable attention 
when its cover blared the rhetorical question: “Is Your Job Next?”. The subtitle read: “A 
new round of globalization is sending upscale jobs offshore. They include chip design, 
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engineering, basic research – even financial analysis. Can America lose these jobs and 
still prosper?”    
 
For three decades now the U.S. economy has been losing unionized blue-collar jobs. As 
it has turned out, Democratic administrations have been no better than Republican 
administrations in stanching the decline (see Uchitelle 2007, ch. 7). In 2011 the U.S. rate 
of business-sector unionization was 6.9 percent, having declined steady from over 15 
percent in 1983 (U.S. Department of Labor 2012). Since the early 1990s nonunionized 
white-collar workers, including professional, technical, and administrative employees 
who are deemed to be members of “management”, have found that they can no longer 
expect that they will have a career with one company. The shift to open systems 
technologies and the globalization of high-tech jobs have rendered the well-educated and 
highly experienced members of the U.S. labor force vulnerable to loss of employment. 
 
It should be emphasized once again that the displacement of workers from middle-class 
jobs often has a productive rationale: manufacturing plants may become uncompetitive; 
recently educated workers may possess more relevant skills than experienced (older) 
workers; and the productive capabilities of workers in low-wage areas of the world may 
be on a par with if not superior to those of workers in the United States. Nevertheless, 
once changes in the structure of employment have become widespread for productive 
reasons, corporations have been known to terminate employees in order to increase 
short-term profits for the sake of inciting speculative increases in their companies’ stock 
prices. As documented below, under a regime of financialized corporate resource 
allocation, the tendency has then been to allocate those extra profits to stock buybacks 
for the purpose of giving a company’s stock price a manipulative boost.  
 
Unlike the recessions of 1980-1982, 1990-1991, and 2001, the Great Recession of 2008-
2009 was a purely financial downturn caused by speculation in and manipulation of 
securities markets by the financial sector of the economy. That speculation and 
manipulation exploited the fragility of homeownership in an economy that since the 
1980s had been the eliminating the stable and remunerative middle-class jobs that had 
made home ownership affordable. The jobless recovery that has followed the Great 
Recession has been far more prolonged than earlier ones. While Wall Street has become 
and remains a gambling casino, the more fundamental fragility of the U.S. economy 
emanates from the industrial sector. As a general rule, as I shall show, the executives 
who run U.S. industrial corporations have become focused on creating profits for the 
sake of higher stock prices rather than creating the high value-added jobs that are the 
essence of a prosperous economy. 
 
Corporate Executives in the Top 0.1 Percent 
 
In the generally prosperous U.S. economy of the immediate post-World War II decades, 
there was a movement toward more equality in the distribution of income. As illustrated 
by the time series for the Gini coefficient in Figure 1, there was then a reversal of this 
trend in the late 1970s followed by an acceleration in inequality in the early 1980s. Since 
then the distribution of income in the United States has become increasingly skewed. As 
measured by the Gini coefficient, income inequality increased in almost all of the OECD 
countries from the mid-1980s to the late 2000s. In both periods, however, the United 
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States has had the most unequal distribution in the OECD except for Turkey and Mexico 
(OECD 2011, 6). 
 
Figure 1.  Gini coefficient, income distribution among all U.S. families, 1947-2010 
 
Note:  For the Gini coefficient, 0 means perfect equality among families in the 
distribution of income, while 1 means that one family has all the income. 
Source: Table F-4 in U.S. Census Bureau (2011) 
 
The prime drivers of the increase in income inequality in the United States have been the 
erosion of middle-class employment opportunities and the explosion of income at the 
very top of the distribution. From 1979 to 2007 real GDP per capita grew by 68.4 
percent in the United States. Over the same period, however, the real after-tax incomes 
of the bottom quintile (1st to 20th percentiles) of the income distribution grew by only 
18.3 percent, the fourth quintile by 27.5 percent, the middle quintile by 35.2 percent, the 
second quintile by 43.3 percent, and the top quintile excluding the top one percent by 
65.0 percent. Meanwhile the real after-tax incomes of the top percentile increased by 
277.5 percent (Congressional Budget Office 2011) 
 
This concentration of income at the top shows up clearly in data collected from Internal 
Revenue Service tax returns on the richest Americans from 1913-2010, displayed in 
Figure 2 (Piketty and Saez 2012). In 2007 the top one percent of the distribution 
received 23.5 percent of pre-tax income, the highest level since 1928, when, during the 
stock market boom that would culminate in the Great Crash, the share of the top one 
percent reached 23.9 percent. Figure 2 also shows the extreme volatility of the income 
shares of the top one percent that has accompanied stock market booms and busts, such 
as those that centered on the peak years 1929, 2000, and 2007. 
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Figure 2.  Shares of total U.S. income among the top 10 percent of income 
recipients, 1913-2010, decomposed into selected percentile groupings 
 
 
Source: Piketty and Saez 2012, data-Fig2. 
 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 3, incomes are highly skewed even within the top one 
percent. At 12.3 percent, the share of the top 0.1 percent in 2007 was higher than the 
previous peak of 11.5 percent in 1928. Figure 3 also shows the extreme volatility of the 
income shares of the top 1.0 percent, 0.5 percent, and 0.1 percent, most markedly 
because of stock market booms and busts that centered on 1929, 2000, and 2007. 
 
There were, however, differences in the sources of the incomes of the top 0.1 percent in 
the late 1920s and late 2000s, as shown in Figure 4. Particularly significant is the 
importance of the stock market as a source of income for the richest Americans in the 
2000s. The gains from exercising stock options can appear in not only the “capital gains” 
component but also the “salaries” component of total incomes. The IRS data collected 
by Piketty and Saez (2012) does not break down total “salaries” taxed at the personal-
income tax rate into their component parts. From the 1950s into the 1970s executive 
stock options enabled top executives to have a portion of their remuneration taxed at the 
relatively low capital-gains tax rate rather than at the high personal-income tax rate 
(Lazonick 2009b). The Economic Recovery Act of 1981, however, both lowered 
substantially the top personal-income tax rate and placed a $100,000 limit per annum on 
the exercisable options (number of options times the exercise price) eligible for capital-
gains taxation (Ellig 2006, 57). Thus for top executives of major corporations whose 
stock-option income often amounts to millions of dollars in a given year, capital-gains 
income from stock options are only a small part of the total gains from exercising 
options.  
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Figure 3. U.S. income shares including capital gains, top 1.0%, 0.5%, and 
0.1% of households, 1913-2010 
 
Source: Piketty and Saez 2012, Table A3. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Components of the percent shares of the incomes of the top 
0.1 percent of the U.S. income distribution, 1916-2010 
 
Source: Piketty and Saez 2012, data-Fig4B 
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As illustrated by the peaks in the “salaries” component in Figure 4, for the top 0.1 
percent of the income distribution, it was gains from exercising stock options that 
pushed up their “salaries” to an historic high of 4.02 percent of total U.S. income in 
2000. This peak was a dramatic rise from 0.59 percent of total U.S. income in 1970, 1.01 
percent in 1980, and 2.09 percent in 1990. This proportion hit a local peak of 3.26 
percent in 2007, and was 2.95 percent in 2010.   
 
Indeed for the highest-paid executives, stock-option income is the largest component of 
their total income. Table 1, based on data from company proxy statements, shows the 
average compensation of the highest paid corporate executives in the United States, and 
the percent of that compensation derived from exercising stock options (the difference 
between the stock-option exercise price and the market price of the stock on the exercise 
date) for 1992-2010. Also included in Table 1 are the S&P 500 Index (with over 80 
percent of its component stocks being listed on the New York Stock Exchange) and the 
NASDAQ Composite Index to illustrate the positive correlation of stock-price 
performance with both the level of executive pay and the proportion of that pay derived 
from stock-option exercises.  
 
Large proportions of these enormous incomes of top executives have come from gains 
from cashing in on the ample stock option awards that their boards of directors have 
bestowed on them. The higher the “top pay” group, the greater the average proportion of 
the pay of the executives in that group that was derived from gains from exercising stock 
options. 
 
For the top 100 group in the years 1992-2010, the proportion from stock-option gains 
ranged from a low of 49 percent in 2010 – when the mean pay of the group was also at 
its second lowest level in real terms since 1995 – to a high of 89 percent in 2000 – when 
the mean pay was at its highest level of $104.0 million in 2010 dollars. In 2000 the mean 
pay of the top 3000 was $10.8 million in 2010 dollars, only ten percent of the mean pay 
of the top 100. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 1, gains from exercising stock options 
accounted for 67 percent of the combined pay of executives in the top 3000 group, with 
mean stock-option gains of 43 percent.  
 
It is important to note in Table 1 how the average pay of the highest paid corporate 
executives has risen and fallen with the fluctuations of major stock market indices. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, high real stock yields characterized the U.S. corporate economy. 
These high yields came mainly from stock-price appreciation as distinct from dividends 
yields, which, with stock prices climbing rapidly, were low in the 1990s despite high 
dividend payout ratios. With the S&P 500 Index rising almost 1,400 percent from March 
1982 to August 2000, the availability of gains from exercising stock options became 
almost automatic. 
 
In the 2000s, in contrast, with the stock market less speculative, corporate executives 
turned to another means of boosting stock prices: large-scale stock repurchases. As I 
have argued elsewhere, there are three drivers of stock prices: innovation, speculation, 
and manipulation (Lazonick 2009b). In the 1980s and 1990s high stock prices were 
driven primarily by a combination of New Economy innovation followed by speculation 
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(Lazonick 2009a and 2009c). In the 2000s rising stock prices of S&P 500 companies 
were driven by manipulation, with large-scale stock repurchases as the prime weapons 
of market manipulation. 
 
Table 1. Average total compensation of “named” executives of U.S. corporations 
and the proportion of total compensation from stock-option gains for the 
100, 500, 1500, and 3000 highest-paid, 1992-2010 
 
   Mean compensation in millions of 2010 U.S. dollars 
 Top 100 Top 500 Top 1500 Top 3000 S&P 
500 
Index 
NAS-
DAQ 
Index 
NAS-
DAQ/ 
S&P 
Mean 
$m. 
% 
SO 
Mean 
$m. 
% 
SO 
Mean 
$m. 
% 
SO 
Mean 
$m. 
% 
SO 
1992 23.1 71 9.3 59 4.7 48 2.9 42 100 100 1.00 
1993 21.1 63 9.1 51 4.8 42 3.1 36 109 119 1.10 
1994 18.5 57 8.1 45 4.4 35 2.9 29 111 125 1.13 
1995 21.0 59 9.7 48 5.3 40 3.5 34 131 155 1.18 
1996 32.4 64 13.9 54 7.2 47 4.6 41 162 195 1.20 
1997 44.2 72 18.6 61 9.5 55 5.9 49 210 243 1.16 
1998 76.0 66 26.7 64 12.5 58 7.5 53 261 300 1.15 
1999 68.9 82 27.4 71 13.2 63 7.8 57 319 462 1.45 
2000 104.0 87 40.5 80 18.7 72 10.8 67 341 614 1.80 
2001 62.9 77 23.9 66 11.5 58 6.9 53 284 332 1.17 
2002 38.1 57 17.1 49 8.8 43 5.5 38 237 252 1.06 
2003 48.7 64 21.2 55 10.8 48 6.7 44 232 275 1.18 
2004 55.4 75 25.0 62 12.9 55 8.1 50 272 330 1.21 
2005 67.5 78 28.7 63 14.5 56 9.0 51 290 348 1.20 
2006 68.9 69 29.6 59 15.4 52 9.7 47 316 463 1.47 
2007 69.3 73 30.2 60 15.8 52 10.0 47 354 428 1.21 
2008 47.5 58 20.7 55 10.9 45 7.0 39 291 356 1.22 
2009 30.4 52 14.8 37 8.3 28 5.5 23 227 307 1.35 
2010 35.9 49 18.3 40 10.4 32 6.8 28 271 386 1.43 
S&P 500 Index and the NASDAQ Composite Index set to 100 in 1992 for purposes of comparison. 
“Named” executives are the CEO and other four highest-paid executives in a given year reported by 
listed companies in their annual proxy statements to shareholders. 
Total compensation (TDC2 in the Compustat database) is defined as “Total compensation for the 
individual year comprised of the following: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of 
Restricted Stock Granted, Net Value of Stock Options Exercised, Long-Term Incentive Payouts, 
and All Other Total”. 
%SO means the percent of total compensation that the whole set (100, 500, 1,500, or 3,000) of 
highest-paid executives derived from gains from exercising stock options. 
Note that company proxy statements (DEF 14A SEC filings) report the compensation of the 
company’s CEO and four other highest paid executives. It is therefore possible that some of the 
highest-paid executives who should be included in each of the “top” categories are excluded. 
The mean compensation calculations are therefore lower bounds of actual average compensation 
of the highest paid corporate executives in the United States.  
Sources: Standard and Poor’s Compustat database (Executive Compensation, Annual); Yahoo! 
Finance at http://finance.yahoo.com (Historical Prices, Monthly Data). 
 
Among the prime beneficiaries of this market manipulation have been the very same 
corporate executives who have made the decisions to allocate corporate resources to 
stock repurchases. In 2010 the threshold income for inclusion in the top 0.1 percent of 
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the income distribution was $1,492,175 (Piketty and Saez 2012, Table 0). From the 
proxy statement data on “named” top executives, in 2010, 4,743 executives had total 
compensation greater than this threshold amount, with a mean income of $5,034,000 and 
gains from exercising stock options representing 26 percent of their combined 
compensation.  
 
The number of corporate executives who in 2010 were members of the top 0.1 percent 
club was, however, far higher that 4,743, for two reasons. Firstly, total corporate 
compensation of the named executives does not include other non-compensation 
taxpayer income (from securities, property, fees for sitting on the boards of other 
corporations, etc.) that would be included in their IRS tax returns. If we assume that 
named executives whose corporate compensation was below the $1.5 million threshold 
were able to augment that income by 25 percent from other sources, then the number of 
named executives in the top 0.1 percent in 2010 would have been 5,555. If (as may well 
have been the case) they were able to augment that income by more than 25 percent, 
then there would be even more of these named executives in the top 0.1 percent. 
 
Secondly, included in the top 0.1 percent of the U.S. income distribution were a 
potentially large, but unknown, number of U.S. corporate executives whose pay was 
above the $1.5 million top 0.1 percent threshold but who were not “named” in proxy 
statements because they were neither the CEO nor the four other highest paid in their 
particular companies. For example, of the five named IBM executives in 2010, the 
lowest paid had total compensation of $6,637,910. There were presumably large 
numbers of other IBM executives whose total compensation was between this amount 
and $1.5 million. These “unnamed” executives would have been among the top 0.1 
percent in the income distribution. 
 
The bottom line is that top executives of U.S. business corporations – industrial as well 
as financial – are well represented among the top 0.1 percent of the U.S. income 
distribution, and much, and often most, of their compensation income comes from the 
gains from exercising stock options. Since the 1980s Wall Street has judged the 
performance of corporations by their quarterly stock-price performance. Given the 
importance of stock-based pay in their compensation, top executives of U.S. 
corporations have a powerful personal incentive to boost their companies’ stock prices 
from quarter to quarter and to manage quarterly earnings per share. In stock buybacks, 
these executives have a found a potent weapon of stock-market manipulation. In the next 
section of this essay, I document how stock buybacks have became systemic and 
massive in the U.S. economy since the 1980s. Then I provide evidence on the damage 
that stock buybacks are doing to the performance of the U.S. economy as measured by 
equitable and stable economic growth. 
 
Stock Buybacks: Weapons of Market Manipulation – and Value Extraction 
 
Until the 1980s stock repurchases were relatively unimportant as a mode of distributing 
profits to shareholders. Buybacks were often done by owner-entrepreneurs of small- to 
medium-size companies who had issued shares on the over-the-counter markets to raise 
funds for expansion but then wanted to have those shares back under their ownership as 
the company progressed (Vermaelen 1981). Indeed, until November 1982 stock 
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repurchases by established companies on a scale that has now become the norm could be 
construed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an illegal attempt to 
manipulate the company’s stock price. Specifically section 9(a)(2) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits a person “to effect…a series of transactions in any 
security registered on a national securities exchange creating actual or apparent 
active trading in such security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for 
the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others” 
(Subcommittee on Annual Review 1983, 1247). 
 
In 1970 the SEC had first discussed a rule change that would have permitted a publicly 
listed company to buy back as much as 15 percent of the average trading volume of its 
stock over the previous four weeks without exposing itself to manipulation charges, but 
this rule was not adopted (Subcommittee on Annual Review 1983, 1247). In 
November 1982, however, with the promulgation of Rule 10b-18, the SEC provided 
companies with a “safe harbor” against charges of stock-price manipulation.  Under the 
safe harbor, the SEC would not file manipulation charges if each day’s open-market 
repurchases were not greater than 25 percent of the stock’s average daily trading volume 
over the previous four weeks and if the company refrained from doing buybacks at the 
beginning and end of the trading day. The Wall Street Journal reported that at the SEC 
meeting at which the Rule 10b-18 was adopted, SEC Chairman John Shad said that 
buybacks would “confer a material benefit” on shareholders by fuelling stock-price 
increases (Hudson 1982).1 Under Rule 10b-18, during the single trading day of, for 
example, July 13, 2011, a leading stock repurchaser such as Exxon Mobil could have 
done as much as $416 million in buybacks, Bank of America $402 million, Microsoft 
$390 million, Intel $285 million, Cisco $269 million, GE $230 million, and IBM $220 
million. And, according to the SEC’s rules, buybacks of these magnitudes can be 
repeated trading day after trading day. 
 
A stock repurchase occurs when a company buys back its own shares. In the United 
States, the SEC requires stock repurchase programs to be approved by the company’s 
board of directors and to be announced publicly. These programs authorize a company’s 
top executives to do a certain amount of buybacks over a certain period of time, but with 
the timing and amount of actual repurchases left to the discretion of the executives. For 
example, on September 22, 2008 Microsoft (2008) announced that “its board of directors 
approved a new share repurchase program authorizing up to an additional $40 billion in 
share repurchases with an expiration of September 30, 2013.” It is then up to the top 
executives to decide whether the company should actually do repurchases, when they 
should be done, and how many shares should be repurchased at any given time. 
Repurchases are almost always done as open-market transactions through the company’s 
broker. Significantly, the SEC does not require the company to announce the buybacks 
at the time they are actually done. Hence only insiders know the precise timing and 
extent of stock buybacks. 
 
                                                
1  In 2003 the SEC amended Rule 10b-18 “to simplify and update the safe harbor provisions in light of 
market developments since the Rule’s adoption.” The amendments also required that in their 10-Q 
filings with the SEC companies report the number and value of share repurchased in the previous 
quarter and the average price paid per share.  See http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8335.htm. 
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Stock repurchases among large U.S. corporations were of minor importance in the early 
1980s, especially before the passage of Rule 10b-18 by the SEC.  As shown n Figure 5. 
for 292 companies in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008 that were publicly listed back 
to 1980, average annual repurchases per company in 1981-1982 were only $6.7 million, 
or 3.6 percent of net income, compared with dividends of $93.0 million, or 49.3 percent 
of net income. After the safe harbor created by Rule 10b-18, repurchases increased 
rapidly through 1987. With many companies turning to buybacks to boost their stock 
prices after the market crash of October 1987, repurchases per company reached $103.0 
million in 1987, 35.3 percent of net income, while dividends represented an additional 
48.7 percent of net income. Over the next four years, however, repurchases declined to 
$51.7 million per company (19.0 percent of net income) in 1991, while dividends rose to 
$180.2 million per company (66.4 percent of net income). 
 
Figure 5. Ratios of cash dividends (DV) and stock repurchases (RP) to net income 
(NI), and mean dividend payments and stock repurchases, 1981-2007, 
among 292 companies in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008 
 
Sources: Standard &Poor’s Compustat database (North America, Fundamentals Annual) and company 10-K  
                filings. 
 
 
There was then a sharp upswing in repurchases, as they increased almost nine-fold from 
1991 to 1998. With dividends increasing more slowly, buybacks surpassed dividends in 
1997 (see Dittmar and Dittmar 2004). In 1997-1999, buybacks per company averaged 
$402.3 million per annum (50.8 percent of net income), while dividends averaged 
$308.8 million per annum (39.0 percent of net income). 
 
Yet in the late 1990s the stage was being set for an even more massive manipulation of 
the market through stock repurchases, especially from 2003. Combined, the 500 
companies in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008 repurchased $489 billion of their own 
stock in 2006, representing 62 percent of their net income, and $595 billion in 2007, 
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representing 89 percent of their net income. Figure 6 shows how the escalating stock 
repurchases by S&P 500 companies from 2003 through 2007 helped to boost the stock 
market, driving the S&P 500 Index even higher in 2007 than its previous peak in 2000. 
 
Figure 6. Stock repurchases by 437 companies in the S&P 500 in January 2009, 
and the movement of the S&P 500 Index, 1997-2008 
 
Sources: Standard and Poor’s Compustat database (North America, Fundamentals Annual); Yahoo! Finance at 
http://finance.yahoo.com (Historical Prices, Monthly Data). 
 
Figure 7 shows the payout ratios and mean payout levels for 419 companies included in 
the S&P 500 Index in January 2011 that were publicly listed from 1997 through 2010. 
From 1997 through 2010 these 419 companies expended $2.7 trillion on stock 
repurchases, an average of $6.5 billion per company, and distributed a total of $2.0 
trillion in cash dividends, an average of $4.8 billion per company. Stock repurchases by 
these 419 companies averaged $296 million in 2003, rising to an average of $1,251 
million in 2007.  
 
The financial crisis led to a significant, but temporary, contraction in repurchase activity. 
Repurchases by S&P 500 companies declined dramatically in 2008 and 2009, as, for 
example, many banks that had been among the largest repurchasers in the previous years 
either went out of business or availed themselves of a government bail-out. After 
dropping to about $300 million per company during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, 
repurchases doubled to around $600 million in 2010, and reached an average of over 
$800 million – or in excess of $400 billion for the entire S&P 500 – in 2011.2 The 
experience of 2003-2007 suggests that, short of another financial meltdown, repurchases 
will continue at these massive levels in 2012 and beyond. 
                                                
2 http://www.factset.com/insider/2012/6/buyback_6.28.12 
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Why do corporations repurchase stock? Executives often claim that buybacks are 
financial investments that signal confidence in the company’s future as measured by its 
stock-price performance (Louis and White 2007; Vermaelen 2005, ch. 3). But 
companies that do buybacks never sell the shares at higher prices to cash in on these 
investments. To do so would be to signal to the market that the company’s stock price 
had peaked, which no CFO would want to do. If, by repurchasing stock, corporate 
executives signal the stock market that their company’s shares are undervalued, these 
same executives will never signal the market that the company’s shares are overvalued 
by selling its stock. 
 
Figure 7: Ratios of cash dividends (DV) and stock repurchases (RP) to net income 
(NI), and mean dividend payments and stock repurchases among 419 
companies in the S&P 500 Index in January 2011, 1997-2010  
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Data for 419 corporations in the S&P 500 Index in January 2011 that were publicly listed 1997-2010. Data for 
companies that end their fiscal years during the first six months of the calendar year are attributed to the previous 
year.    
RP, stock repurchases; DV, total dividends (common and preferred); NI, net income (after tax with inventory 
evaluation and capital consumption adjustments). 
Sources: S&P Compustat database (North America, Fundamentals Annual, 1997-2010); company 10-K filings for 
missing or erroneous data from the Compustat database. 
 
According to the “signaling” argument, there should have been massive sales of 
corporate stock in the speculative boom of the late 1990s, as was in fact the case of U.S. 
industrial corporations in the speculative boom of the late 1920s when corporations took 
advantage of the speculative stock market to pay off corporate debt or bolster their 
corporate treasuries (O’Sullivan 2004). Instead, in the late 1990s boom corporate 
executives as personal investors sold their own stock to reap speculative gains, often 
worth tens of millions of dollars (see Gimein et al. 2002). Many of these same corporate 
executives as corporate decision-makers used corporate funds to repurchase their 
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companies’ shares in the attempt to bolster their stock prices – to their own personal 
gain. Given the fact that in the United States companies are not required to announce the 
dates on which they actually counter open market repurchases, there is an opportunity 
for top executives who have this information to engage in insider trading by using this 
information to time option exercises and stock sales (see Fried 2000 and 2001).  
 
Indeed, as a complement to the SEC’s Rule 10b-18 of 1982 that, as we have seen, 
effectively legalized the use of buybacks to manipulate stock prices, in 1991 the SEC 
changed a rule that enabled top executives to make quick gains by exercising their stock 
options and immediately selling their shares. Under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act, corporate directors, officers or shareholders with more than 10 percent of 
the corporation’s shares are prohibited from making “short-swing” profits through the 
purchase and the subsequent sale of corporate securities within a six-month period. 
Under this rule, top executives who exercised stock options had to hold the acquired 
shares for at least six months before selling them. Treating a stock option as a derivative, 
however, in May 1991 the SEC deemed that the six-month holding period required 
under Section 16(b) was from the grant date, not the exercise date (Rosen 1991). Since 
the grant date for an employee stock option is always at least one year before the option 
vests (and hence can be exercised), the new rule eliminated the risk of loss between the 
exercise date and the sale date. It gave top executives flexibility in their timing of option 
exercises with a view to immediate stock sales so that they could personally benefit from 
price boosts from buybacks. 
 
Companies often explicitly state in their financial statements that they repurchase stock 
to offset dilution from their stock-option programs. The economic rationale for this 
argument is not clear. If a company deems it worthwhile to remunerate employees with 
stock options, it should see that remuneration as adding to rather than subtracting from 
earnings per share. True, these additions to earnings per share may be expected to accrue 
in years to come; but then, according to conventional financial metrics, the issue is 
simply one of whether remuneration in the form of stock options (or any other mode of 
compensation) is expected to yield positive net present value of future earnings at the 
appropriate discount rate. Buying back stock in order to offset the dilution from stock-
option exercises is just another form of stock-price manipulation through adjustments to 
earnings per share (EPS). 
 
In any case, for many leading companies, such as those in ICT, that have broad-based 
stock option plans, the number of shares repurchased is generally well in excess of the 
number of stock options exercised, and hence the number needed to offset dilution. For 
example, for the decade 2001-2010, at ICT companies with broad-based option plans 
that were among the top 50 repurchasers (see Appendix), the ratio of shares repurchased 
to options exercised was 2.75 at Microsoft (the #2 repurchaser in 2001-2010), 3.76 at 
IBM #3), 2.60 at Cisco Systems (#4), 2.96 at Hewlett-Packard (#6), 3.83 at Intel (#11), 
4.24 at Dell (#16), 2.06 at Oracle (#24), and 4.31 at Texas Instruments (#28). At other 
non-ICT companies among the top ten repurchasers in 2001-2010, the buyback-to-
exercises ratio was 10.25 at Exxon Mobil (#1), 4.47 at Procter & Gamble (#5), 13.67 at 
Walmart (#7), 1.96 at Bank of America (#8), and 5.61 at Pfizer (#9). 
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If offsetting dilution fails to justify repurchases, then why, to repeat the question asked 
earlier, do corporations repurchase stock? The only plausible answer to this question is 
that the executives who make these corporate allocation decisions use stock buybacks to 
boost their companies’ stock prices and manage quarterly EPS. Their stock-based pay, 
give executives personal incentives to make these allocation decisions. The corporation 
buys stock to boost its stock price; corporate executives exercise options and sell stock 
to boost their incomes. Stock buybacks and stock options have become the yin and yang 
of U.S. corporate resource allocation. Unfortunately, it is a system of corporate resource 
allocation that is very damaging to the U.S. economy. 
 
Stock Buybacks: Weapons of Value Destruction 
 
Since the 1980s, corporate resource allocation in the United States has been governed by 
the ideology that business corporations should be run to “maximize shareholder value” 
(MSV). The argument propounded by what became known among economists as 
“agency theory”3 is that, of all participants in the business corporation, it is only 
shareholders who make productive contributions without a guarantee of a return.4 As 
risk-bearers, so the argument goes, shareholders, and only shareholders, have a claim on 
corporate profits if and when they appear.  
 
Among other things, MSV ideology legitimizes the practice of making distributions to 
shareholders in the form of not only dividends, which reward shareholders for holding 
the company’s stock, but also repurchases, which reward shareholders for selling the 
company’s stock. MSV ideology also legitimizes the stock-based pay of corporate 
executives on the grounds that this mode of compensation aligns their self-interests with 
those of shareholders upon whom, according to the ideology, we ultimately rely to 
allocate the economy’s resources to its most efficient uses. 
 
Elsewhere I have critiqued this ideology on the grounds that there are other stakeholders 
besides shareholders who, through the provision of capital or labor, make contributions 
to the business enterprise that help to generate future returns but without a guaranteed 
share of these returns (Lazonick 2009b and 2012; Lazonick and Mazzucato 2012). 
Through government investments and subsidies, taxpayers regularly provide finance to 
companies without a guaranteed return. As risk bearers, therefore, taxpayers have a 
claim on corporate profits if and when they are generated. In addition, through the 
                                                
3 “Agency theory” as expounded by economists builds on the legal concept of the corporate manager as 
agent and the shareholder as principal, but uses it to analyze the implications of “hidden actions” (or 
moral hazard) and “hidden information” (or adverse selection) on economic decision-making and 
outcomes. For a critique of “shareholder primacy”, see Stout 2012. 
4 See Lazonick 2012a for an elaboration of this argument. In the 1980s and 1990s, the foremost proponent 
of agency theory as applied to corporate resource allocation was Michael C. Jensen, who was at the 
University of Rochester before coming to Harvard Business School in the mid-1980s. See especially 
Jensen 1986 and Jensen and Murphy 1990. For a highly readable account of the evolution of agency 
theory as a branch of neoclassical economics, see Justin Fox’s The Myth of the Rational Market (2009). 
In his discussion of the theories and impact of Jensen, however, Fox (2011, chs. 9 and 15) completely 
ignores Jensen’s arguments in favor of disgorging the so-called “free cash flow” from corporations to 
shareholders, with stock buybacks as a prime mode of achieving this objective. For my initial critiques 
of MSV and agency theory, written when I was involved with the “business history group” at Harvard 
Business School in the late 1980s and early 1990s, see Lazonick 1988 and 1992. 
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exercise of skill and effort beyond those levels required to lay claim to their current pay, 
workers regularly make productive contributions to the companies for which they work 
without a guaranteed return, but with an expectation of future returns out of profits in the 
forms of higher wages and benefits, more secure employment, and better work 
conditions. Indeed, within the discourse of economics, confronting agency theory with 
what I call “innovation theory” (see Lazonick 2010b; also Lazonick and Mazzucato 
2012), I argue that this sharing of the gains to risk-bearing with taxpayers and workers is 
essential to not only an equitable income distribution but also the sustainable 
productivity gains that make higher standards of living possible.5 
 
From the perspective of innovation theory, stock buybacks are a mode of extracting 
value that can undermine the processes of creating value in companies and in the 
economy. It is very difficult to argue that stock buybacks by large established companies 
are good for the economy, unless one wants to argue that massive manipulation of the 
stock market is good or that the further concentration of income among the top 0.1 
percent of the distribution is good. At the same time, there are many reasons why 
buybacks might be bad for both companies and the economy.  The negative impacts of 
buybacks vary across different sectors in the economy, depending on the technological, 
market, and competitive conditions that characterize these sectors, and hence the types 
of investments in innovation that must be made to generate future growth. Given that 
most companies conduct buybacks when they are profitable and that the implications of 
the failure to invest in innovation today will only become apparent in the future, the 
negative impacts of buybacks on the productive performance of the economy may take 
many years to reveal themselves.   
 
As part of an ongoing research agenda, I have been examining how buybacks have 
adversely affected the delivery of higher quality, lower cost products in a range of 
industries from oil refining to health insurance (Lazonick 2009c; 2012; Lazonick and 
Tulum 2011).  Here are some examples of these adverse effects from energy, ICT, 
pharmaceuticals, and banks. 
 
Energy 
 
Exxon Mobil, the world’s largest petroleum refiner, did $174.5 billion in buybacks 
during 2001-2010 – the most of any company – despite society’s need for large-scale 
investments in energy alternatives. Among the top 50 stock repurchasers in 2001-2010 
were two other petroleum refiners: Chevron at #21 with $26.0 billion and 
ConocoPhillips at #25 with $22.0 billion (see Appendix).  Alternative energy needs the 
collaboration of both government and business to provide “patient” capital. If the big oil 
companies, with all their profits, will not provide it, then perhaps venture capitalists will. 
Yet, as illustrated by the highly publicized case of Solyndra, which went bankrupt in 
August 2011, leaving U.S. taxpayers responsible for $535 million in government-backed 
loans, private equity bailed out when it became evident that the company would be 
unable to do a quick IPO (Hopkins and Lazonick 2011).  
                                                
5  In other work, I have invoked innovation theory to critique Oliver Williamson’s version of agency 
theory as an explanation of relation between markets and organizations. See Lazonick 1991, chs. 6 and 
7 and Lazonick 2002. 
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In June 2010 the self-styled American Energy Innovation Council (AEIC), made up of 
current and former heads of Bank of America, Cummins Engine, Du Pont, General 
Electric, Lockheed Martin, Microsoft, and Xerox as well as John Doerr, partner in the 
venture capital firm, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, put out a plan for “America’s 
Energy Future”.6  The plan called for the U.S. government to increase spending on clean 
energy innovation to $16 billion annually, up from an annual government investment of 
$5 billion (Broder 2010). In a press release, entitled “American Business Leaders Call 
for Revolution in Energy Technology Innovation”,7 Doerr stated: 
When our company [Kleiner Perkins] shifted our attention to clean energy, we 
found the innovation cupboard was close to bare. America has simply neglected 
to support serious energy innovation. My partners and I found the best fuel cells, 
the best energy storage, and the best wind technologies were all born outside the 
United States. Other countries are investing huge amounts in these fields. 
Without innovation, we cannot build great energy companies. We need to 
restock the cupboard or be left behind.” 
The corporate executives who constitute AEIC are looking for the U.S. taxpayer to foot 
the bill for stocking the alternative energy cupboard. What about contributions to a 
national clean energy effort by business corporations that ultimately stand to profit from 
these new technologies? Over the decade 2001-2010, the seven corporations whose 
current or former leaders were represented on AEIC wasted a total of $237 billion – an 
average of $23.7 billion per year – buying back their companies’ stock, including $110.0 
billion by Microsoft, $52.1 billion by Bank of America, and $48.5 billion by General 
Electric.  This money, even a small portion of it, could have been spent on research to 
“restock the cupboard” with U.S.-based innovations. Instead it went to boosting stock 
prices and, in the process, lining the pockets of these highly paid executives who lobby 
Congress to have taxpayers make investments in America’s energy future. 
 
ICT 
 
Leading ICT companies do massive buybacks even as they shift high-tech jobs from the 
United States to low-wage countries and pressure the U.S. government to make larger 
investments in the high-tech knowledge base. In the decade 2001-2010 the top 
repurchasers among ICT companies were Microsoft $110.0 billion (#2 among all 
repurchasers), IBM $89.2 billion (#3), Cisco Systems $65.0 billion (#4), Hewlett-
Packard $54.0 billion (#6), and Intel $48.3 billion (#11).  
 
The world’s leading semiconductor company, Intel, has lobbied the U.S. government to 
spend more on nanotechnology research. For example, at a press conference of the 
Semiconductor Industry Association in Washington DC in March 2005 to urge the 
federal government to increase funding of nanotechnology research, Craig Barrett, then 
CEO of Intel, warned: “U.S. leadership in the nanoelectronics era is not guaranteed. It 
will take a massive, coordinated U.S. research effort involving academia, industry, and 
                                                
6 http://www.americanenergyinnovation.org/the-plan 
7 http://www.americanenergyinnovation.org/business-leaders-call-for-revo 
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state and federal governments to ensure that America continues to be the world leader in 
information technology.”8 Yet in that same year, 2005, Intel expended $10.6 billion on 
stock buybacks, 2.6 times the amount that the U.S. government spent on the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) from its inception in 2001 through 2005. Indeed, the 
$48.3 billion that Intel spent on buybacks in 2001-2010 was more than four times the 
total of $12.0 billion that, over the same period, the U.S. government allocated to the 
NNI.9  
 
Over the decade Intel spent $51.9 billion on R&D, equivalent to 15.0 percent of sales. 
And over this period the manufacture of its microprocessors progressed from 130 
nanometer to 32 nanometer technology, thus continuing its “Moore’s Law” trajectory of 
placing ever greater computing power on a silicon chip.10 But its buybacks were equal to 
94 percent of the company’s R&D expenditures, and 81 of its net income, while its 
dividend payouts were another 32 percent of net income. That is, 113 percent of Intel’s 
net income in the 2000s was devoted to “maximizing shareholder value”. 
 
The ICT industry in general and Intel in particular have benefited from decades of 
government investment in the nation’s high-tech knowledge base (see, e.g., National 
Research Council 1999). Instead of doing buybacks, Intel and other major U.S. ICT 
companies should consider allocating a portion of their substantial resources to support 
national technology programs. For example, if over the decade Intel alone had allocated 
to the NNI just one-tenth of the amount that it spent on buybacks, it would have 
increased the program’s budget by 40 percent, while setting an example for other high-
tech companies to follow. By giving the government a return on its past investments in 
high-technology for the sake of reinvestment in the knowledge base, the business sector 
could help to ensure that as Barrett put it, “America continues to be the world leader in 
information technology”. 
 
To be sure, Wall Street is pressuring the executives of these highly profitable high-tech 
companies to “create value” for shareholders. It is illuminating to focus on a particular 
example on how one of the richest and most powerful corporations in the world has 
acquiesced to this pressure. In June 2004, with a dividend yield of just 0.6 percent on its 
stock, Microsoft’s corporate treasury was bursting with $56 billion in cash and short-
term investments, and its balance sheet showed no debt. The highly profitable company, 
moreover, had generated almost $16 billion in cash flow in the previous year.  
 
Given these conditions, in mid-2004 demands emanated from Wall Street for Microsoft 
to increase its distributions to shareholders and increase its stock price. A Goldman 
Sachs report by its software analyst suggested that, by borrowing $30 billion and using 
$70 billion in cash balances, Microsoft could do a $100 million stock repurchase 
(Bishop 2004). A month later, in July 2004, the Microsoft board approved a $30 billion 
repurchase plan to take place over four years, a doubling of the dividend from $0.16 per 
annum to $.08 quarterly, and a special one-time dividend that, at $3 per share (over 12 
percent of the current share price), totaled $32.64 billion.  
                                                
8 “U.S. could lose race for nanotech leadership, SIA panel says,” Electronic News, March 16, 2005.  
9 http://nano.gov/about-nni/what/funding 
10 Intel 10-K filing, 2001, 10; Intel 10-K filing, 2010, 2. 
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The company press release that announced these distributions assured the public that 
“[t]his payout will not affect Microsoft’s commitment to research and development to 
fuel growth in the years ahead” (Microsoft 2004). In support of this commitment, it 
quoted Chairman Bill Gates: “We see incredible potential for our innovation to help 
businesses, individuals and governments around the world accomplish their goals, and 
we will continue to be one of the top innovators in our industry – as evidenced by the 
fact that we will file for more than 3,000 patents this fiscal year.” The press release also 
quoted CEO Steve Ballmer: “We will continue to make major investments across all our 
businesses and maintain our position as a leading innovator in the industry, but we can 
now also provide up to $75 billion in total value to shareholders over the next four 
years.”  
 
Just over a year and a half later, on April 27, 2006, Microsoft announced that it would be 
making major new technology investments, including a large-scale commitment of 
resources to its online business to confront Yahoo! and Google. The company predicted 
earnings per share of $1.36 to $1.41 for fiscal 2007, well below the expectation of Wall 
Street analysts of $1.57. Rick Sherland, the same Goldman Sachs analyst who had 
previously encouraged Microsoft to do a $100 million repurchase, was not pleased with 
the Microsoft announcement: “It’s bad to surprise the Street. It’s harmful to the stock 
because investors are looking for the rewards of this big product cycle next year flowing 
through to earnings” (quoted in Romano 2006). The next day Microsoft’s stock price fell 
by more than 11 percent, reducing the company’s market capitalization by some $30 
billion. The stock price continued to decline during most of May, amid criticism from 
Wall Street’s top-rated software analysts that Microsoft was a mature firm that had 
attracted “value investors” who wanted returns from dividends and buybacks. An article 
from Bloomberg News (Bass 2006a) quoted the head of an investment company that 
held 14.3 million Microsoft shares, as saying, “They are not managing the business with 
an acknowledgment the shareholders have changed. People expecting 25 percent annual 
growth don’t own the stock anymore.” 
 
On May 31 Ballmer defended the company’s “big, bold bets” on Internet technology at a 
conference at Sanford C. Bernstein & Company, the Wall Street investment research 
firm (Bass 2006b). Wall Street remained critical of Microsoft’s technology strategy.11 
Microsoft’s stock price, which had trended downward during May but had moved 
upward in the days before the Bernstein conference, resumed its decline. The stock 
prices reached a low on June 13, almost 21 percent down from its level on April 27, 
when Microsoft had revealed its new investment plans. Finally, on July 20, Microsoft 
announced that it was accelerating by two years the completion of its $30 billion 
buyback program. At the same time, Microsoft also announced a plan to repurchase 
another $20 billion in stock from 2007 to 2011. Over the next four days, Microsoft’s 
stock price rose by almost 7 percent. 
 
If some of the richest and most influential corporative executives in the world feel 
compelled to kowtow to Wall Street, they feel far less obliged to keep their workers 
employed, especially when they want to do buybacks and boost their stock prices. In the 
                                                
11 “Microsoft to use cash for development, not share buybacks,” New York Times, June 1, 2006: C11. 
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first half of 2009, IBM laid off almost 10,000 people in the United States and Canada 
even as it “created value” for shareholders by expending $7.4 billion in buybacks (along 
with $2.9 billion in dividends) out of an income of $13.4 billion. At the beginning of 
February 2009 IBM offered the first round of displaced workers “Project Match” 
(McDougall 2009). As described in an internal document, the purpose of Project Match 
was to “help you [employees]locate potential job opportunities in growth markets where 
your skills are in demand.” The document went on to say, “Should you accept a position 
in one of these countries, IBM offers financial assistance to offset moving costs, 
provides immigration support, such as visa assistance, and other support to help ease the 
transition of an international move.” Eligible for Project Match were “satisfactory 
performers who have been notified of separation from IBM U.S. or Canada and are 
willing to work on local terms and conditions.” That is, an eligible American worker laid 
off by IBM could apply to IBM for a job in, for example, India, and if rehired by IBM, 
would be paid the wages prevailing there. 
 
Along with mass terminations, some cash-rich companies have even taken on debt to 
buy back their stock. In early 2009 Intel announced that it would be doing 5,000-6,000 
layoffs, and then in July 2009 announced that it was floating a convertible debt issue for 
$1.75 billion, of which $1.5 billion would be used for buybacks. In May 2009 Microsoft 
said that it would lay off 5,000 employees – its first ever mass layoff – and also that it 
would be doing a $3.75 billion bond issue – its first ever financing of this type – in order 
to do buybacks. In 2009 Intel generated $11.2 billion in cash from operations, and at the 
end of the year (after paying out $1.8 billion in repurchases and $3.1 billion in 
dividends) had $4.0 billion in cash and cash equivalents on hand. In 2009 Microsoft 
generated $19.0 billion in cash from operations and at the end of the year (after paying 
out $9.4 billion in repurchases and $4.5 billion in dividends) had $6.1 billion in cash and 
cash equivalents on hand at the end of the year. Why, then, were these cash-rich 
companies borrowing money to do buybacks? They held much of the cash abroad, and, 
as I discuss further below, would have been subject to U.S. corporate taxes on 
repatriated profits if they had brought back that money to do buybacks. 
 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
Pharmaceutical drug prices are at least double in the United States compared with 
European countries (UK Department of Health 2009, 27) The healthcare industry, 
including biopharmaceuticals and medical devices, benefits immensely from U.S. 
federal government spending on life sciences through the National Institutes of Health, 
with total annual budgets averaging $30.9 billion from 2009 through 2012.12 In opposing 
the regulation of drug prices by the U.S. Congress, the pharmaceutical companies argue 
that they need high prices to fund their R&D expenditures in the United States. Yet 
among major pharmaceutical companies, in 1997-2010 Pfizer did repurchases equal to 
64 percent of R&D expenditures, Johnson & Johnson 56 percent, and Merck 53 percent. 
When the substantial dividends that these companies paid are added to their repurchases, 
shareholder distributions exceeded R&D expenditures over this period by 32 percent at 
Pfizer, 17 percent at Johnson & Johnson, and 31 percent at Merck. In 2011, along with 
$6.2 billion in dividends, Pfizer repurchased $9.0 billion in stock, equivalent to 90 
                                                
12 http://www.nih.gov/about/budget.htm.   
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percent of its net income and 99 percent of its R&D expenditures. While Americans pay 
inflated price for drugs, major pharmaceutical companies allocate billions to buybacks, 
and then find that they do not have new blockbusters in the pipeline to replace those 
whose patents are now expiring. 
 
Amgen, the largest dedicated biopharmaceutical company, has repurchased stock in 
every year since 1992, for a total of $42.2 billion through 2011, including $8.3 billion in 
2011.  Since 2002 the cost of Amgen’s stock repurchases has surpassed the company’s 
R&D expenditures in every year except 2004, and for the period 1992-2011 was equal to 
fully 115 percent of R&D outlays and 113 percent of net income.  
 
In May 2007 Amgen even borrowed $3.2 billion ($2.0 billion due in 2008, $1.1 billion 
in 2017, and $0.9 billion due in 2037) to help finance a $5.0 billion stock repurchase, the 
largest annual purchase that the company had ever done. At the same time, as Amgen 
reported in its quarterly financial filing, sales of its blockbuster anemia drug, Aranesp, 
declined by 19 percent because of an Food and Drug Administration ruling that dosage 
levels had to be cut because of cases of heart attacks from high doses (Chase 2007). 
 
On August 13, 2007, just after Amgen issued its second quarter 10-Q filing, an analyst at 
Bernstein Research wrote: “Amgen will likely lose at least 40 percent of their U.S. 
Aranesp revenue by 2008 with even greater downside possible for both Aranesp and 
Epogen if upcoming [Medicare and Medicaid] reimbursement and regulatory decisions 
go against them.” But the analyst reportedly added: “If Amgen cuts costs, continues to 
buy back stock and improves its tax rate…it could increase its earnings per share by 10-
12% each year from 2008 to 2011, even if it does not develop any significant drug 
candidates.”13 
 
Two days later, Amgen announced that it would reduce its workforce by 14 
percent, or 2,600 jobs, cut capital expenditures by $1.9 billion, close some of its 
production facilities, and reduce R&D expenses (which had been at 27 percent from 
2003 through 2006) to 20 percent of sales (Chase 2007). It appears that Amgen 
borrowed money to do the $5 billion stock repurchase because it wanted to offset the 
adverse impact of the Aranesp news on its stock price. In any case, the priorities of 
Amgen’s top executives in their allocation of corporate resources seem clear: keep the 
company’s stock price up before all else. 
 
Finance 
 
Among the biggest stock repurchasers in the years prior to the financial crisis were many 
of the banks that were responsible for the meltdown and were bailed out under the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program. They included Citigroup ($41.8 billion repurchased in 
2000-2007), Goldman Sachs ($30.1 billion), Wells Fargo ($23.2 billion), JP Morgan 
Chase ($21.2 billion), Merrill Lynch ($21.0 billion), Morgan Stanley ($19.1 billion), 
American Express ($17.6 billion), and US Bancorp ($12.3 billion). In the eight years 
before it went bankrupt in 2008, Lehman Brothers repurchased $16.8 billion, including 
                                                
13 “Amgen moves up after analyst says company will restructure to increase earnings,” Associated Press 
Financial Wire, August 13, 2007. 
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$5.3 billion in 2006-2007, when it was apparently doing buybacks to combat the efforts 
of short-sellers to push down its stock price (Trincal 2008). Washington Mutual, which 
also went bankrupt in 2008, expended $13.3 billion on buybacks in 2000-2007, 
including $6.5 billion in 2006-2007. Wachovia, ranked 38th among the Fortune 500 in 
2007, did $15.7 billion in buybacks in 2000-2007, including $5.7 billion in 2006-2007, 
before its fire sale to Wells Fargo at the end of 2008. Other financial institutions that did 
substantial repurchases in 2000-2007 before running into financial distress in 2008 were 
AIG ($10.2 billion), Fannie Mae ($8.4 billion), Bear Stearns ($7.2 billion), and Freddie 
Mac ($4.7 billion). By spending money on buybacks during boom years, these financial 
corporations reduced their ability to withstand the crash of the derivatives market in 
2008, thus exacerbating the jeopardy that they created for the economy as a whole.  
 
What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained 
 
All of this buyback activity is going on in a context in which, even without them, 
rationalization, marketization, and globalization have been eroding middle-class 
employment opportunities. With automation and new competition, good blue-collar jobs 
for people with only high school educations disappear. The ongoing evolution of open 
systems tends to devalue the capabilities of experienced employees, even those with 
college educations. And meanwhile the capabilities of labor in lower-wage areas of the 
world continue to advance, thus making it possible for U.S.-based companies to offshore 
even higher value-added work rather than continuing to employ more expensive 
personnel in the United States. 
 
As stated earlier in this essay, the disappearance of middle-class jobs reflects structural 
changes in the ways in which U.S. business corporations employ the U.S. labor force. 
Quite apart from the financialization of the corporation, the evolution of technology, 
markets, and competition on a global scale means that the same types of jobs that once 
provided U.S. households with middle-class living standards will not come back. 
Especially in a high-wage economy, which the United States still remains, sustainable 
prosperity requires investments in innovation that can deliver high value-added 
employment opportunities. Governments have to invest for the future by spending on 
physical infrastructures and the knowledge base. Households have to invest for the 
future by developing the next generation’s labor force. But the combination of 
government and household investment will come to naught if businesses do not invest in 
generating higher quality products at lower unit costs.  It is the failure of U.S. businesses 
to invest sufficiently in innovation that is undermining the achievement of equitable and 
stable economic growth in the United States. 
 
At the root of the problem is the financialization of corporate resource allocation. Stock 
buybacks greatly exacerbate the problem of the eroding middle class as U.S. business 
corporations neglect to invest for the future. While doing buybacks, these corporations 
have tended to ignore the myriad technological and market opportunities in areas such as 
communications, medicine, transportation, and energy that would provide new high 
value-added employment in the United States.  
 
Why are U.S. corporate executives so intent on making these financialized allocation 
decisions? Certainly they have become captive to the false ideology of maximizing 
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shareholder value. But they have also become very rich as a result. In a society that 
probably more than any other on earth extols the virtues of “economic man”, it should 
be no surprise that the most powerful economic men – the corporate executives who 
control the future of innovation and job creation – view their ability to extract value 
from the economy as the best possible way to create value for the economy. 
 
From the perspective of the theory of innovative enterprise (Lazonick 2012b), 
Americans are paying these top executives not to do their jobs.14  One can ask whether 
the types of top executives who spend their time thinking about how to boost stock 
prices are thinking about the new, and inherently uncertain, opportunities for making 
innovative use of their companies’ productive capabilities. Rather than dissipating the 
company’s capital by doing stock buybacks and devaluing the company’s labor by 
terminating experienced employees, corporate executives could be thinking about how 
to keep the money and the people together, possibly in corporate spinoffs, to deliver new 
sources of value to customers. 
 
The function of the executive is to allocate corporate resources to investments that can 
generate higher quality products at lower unit costs. Instead, through buybacks and 
layoffs, corporations have thrown money and people onto capital and labor markets, For 
the sake of sustainable prosperity, corporate executives should be looking for new ways 
to combine patient capital and experienced workers to create the new goods and services 
that an advanced economy needs and can afford. 
 
Sustainable prosperity depends on these corporate investments in innovation and job 
creation. When there is job displacement because of rationalization, marketization, and 
globalization, business and government must collaborate to ensure the availability of the 
education and training needed to reposition displaced workers to perform new 
productive roles in the economy. The “financialized” corporation, with its obsession 
with stock-price performance, tends to opt out of this collaborative effort because it 
operates according to an ideology that argues that it has no responsibility for the 
displaced workers. In doing so, the financialized corporation not only avoids a share of 
the cost of retraining its workers but also fails to participate in making the investments 
that can generate new and potentially sustainable middle-class jobs for the U.S. labor 
force.  
 
Meanwhile U.S. tax law helps to destroy middle-class jobs in the United States by 
encouraging companies to offshore employment. In the jobless recovery that has 
followed the Great Recession, U.S. business corporations have been highly profitable. 
Indeed, even as stock buybacks escalated once again in 2011, U.S. business corporations 
were sitting on an estimated $1.4 trillion in offshore accounts (see for example, Hirsch 
2011), encouraged to do so by a 50-year-old tax loophole that permits them to defer the 
                                                
14  Relatedly, Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen argues that companies that focus on 
profits do not innovate (see Denning 2011). See also Christensen et al. 2008. There is a tradition of this 
type of skepticism of the financialized corporation at Harvard Business School going back at least to 
the widely read 1980 Harvard Business Review article by Robert Hayes and William Abernathy, 
“Managing Our Way to Economic Decline”.  See also the critique of MSV by Martin 2011.   
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payment of taxes on corporate profits, for which the rate is 35 percent, until they 
repatriate them to the United States (see Lazonick 2011b).  
 
In the 2004 Presidential campaign, John Kerry proposed amendments to the tax code 
that would reward U.S. companies for creating jobs in the United States rather than 
moving jobs offshore. The preferred approach of the Bush Administration was the 
Homeland Investment Act as part of the American Job Creation Act of 2004 that 
provided a one-year corporate income tax holiday on profits repatriated, with the 
stipulation that these profits had to be used for investments that create jobs. The Act 
expressly prohibited the use of these funds to pay dividends or do stock buybacks. U.S. 
corporations responded by repatriating $299 billion in profits in 2005 compared with an 
average of $62 billion in 2000-2004 and a subsequent decline to $102 billion in 2006 
(Dharmapala et al. 2010).  
 
But Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2010, 4-5) found that corporations subverted the 
purpose of the government’s repatriation initiative. As they put it:  
 
Rather than being associated with increased expenditures on domestic investment 
or employment, repatriations were associated with significantly higher levels of 
payouts to shareholders, mainly taking the form of share repurchases. Estimates 
imply that a $1 increase in repatriations was associated with an increase in 
payouts to shareholders of between $0.60 and $0.92, depending on the 
specification.   
 
They suggest that companies were able to make these distributions to shareholders 
without violating the terms of the repatriation legislation by using the repatriated funds 
“to pay for investment, hiring, or R&D that was already planned, thereby releasing cash 
that had previously been allocated for these purposes to be used for payouts to 
shareholders.” 
 
A persistent promise in Barack Obama’s campaigns for the Senate in 2004 and the 
Presidency in 2008 was that he would end tax breaks for corporations that ship jobs 
overseas. In a speech in May 2009, President Obama (2009) declared: “It’s a tax code 
that says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job in Bangalore, India, than if you 
create one in Buffalo, New York.” In June 2009, Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer 
responded that an end to the overseas tax deferral would make “U.S. jobs more 
expensive”, and that if the Obama Administration insisted on changing the tax law 
Microsoft would be “better off taking lots of people and moving them out of the U.S.” 
(Donmoyer 2009). In September 2009 the Obama Administration met with U.S. high-
tech executives, and agreed to shelf the plan to end the tax deferral (King and 
Williamson 2009).  Nevertheless, in his State of the Union address on January 27, 2010, 
President Obama insisted that “it is time to finally slash the tax breaks for companies 
that ship our jobs overseas and give those tax breaks to companies that create jobs right 
here in the United States of America” (Obama 2010). 
 
This tax loophole has not yet been closed. Indeed, in October 2010, John Chambers, 
chairman and CEO of Cisco Systems, and Safra Catz, president of Oracle, published a 
Wall Street Journal opinion piece in which they sought to counter criticism in the press 
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that U.S. corporations were sitting on one trillion dollars in cash instead of investing in 
jobs in the United States (Chambers and Catz 2010). The two high-tech executives 
claimed that U.S. corporations were holding the cash in question overseas, and 
contended that these funds “could be invested in U.S. jobs, capital assets, research and 
development, and more” if U.S. corporations had an incentive to do so. “But,” they 
continued (with my emphasis), “for U.S companies such repatriation of earnings carries 
a significant penalty: a federal tax of up to 35%. This means that U.S. companies can, 
without significant consequence, use their foreign earnings to invest in any country in 
the world—except here.”  
 
Having transformed an existing U.S. government tax concession to U.S. corporations 
into a tax penalty on U.S. corporations, Chambers and Catz noted that, among other 
things, repatriated profits could “provide needed stability for the equity markets because 
companies would expand their activity in mergers and acquisitions, and would pay 
dividends or buy back stock.” To lure the $1 trillion back to the United States, they 
proposed a 5% tax on repatriated profits that would yield the U.S. government a quick 
$50 billion, which could then “be used to help put America back to work…[by giving] 
employers – large or small – a refundable tax credit for hiring previously unemployed 
workers (including recent graduates).”  “Such a program,” they crowed, “could help put 
more than two million Americans back to work at no cost to the government or 
American taxpayers. How’s that for a good idea?” Along with other business executives, 
Chambers presented his “good idea” directly to President Obama at the White House on 
December 15, 2010 (Drucker 2010).  
 
Innovation and job creation require business-government collaboration (Lazonick 2008 
and 2011a; Block 2009; Block and Keller 2011; see also Breznitz 2007; Gomory 2009). 
Government investment in physical infrastructures such as communication networks and 
transportation systems as well as human capital through higher education and research 
facilities provides an essential foundation for business investment, especially in high-
tech fields. Government subsidies to business, often implemented through tax legislation, 
can serve as further inducements to business investment. As already mentioned, in the 
United States, government funding has been critical to the emergence and development 
of high-tech sectors such as computers, the Internet, biotechnology, and alternative 
energy.  
 
But for these government investments and subsidies, the United States would not lead 
the world in venture capital – an industry devoted to new-firm formation and growth. 
Yet, in the United States, it can be argued that a disproportionate share of the returns to a 
successful new venture accrues to those entrepreneurs and financiers who put an 
innovation on the market while neglecting to reward sufficiently the contributions of 
other stakeholders, including taxpayers, who made significant contributions to the 
innovation process (see Lazonick 2009a). In the name of “shareholder value”, rewards 
are reaped at the expense of non-shareholding stakeholders who risked their labor and 
capital in the collective and cumulative innovation process (Lazonick and Mazzucato 
2012).  
 
Once a new venture has become a going concern, MSV ideology continues to hold sway. 
Innovation may drive stock prices for a while, and thousands of employees can share in 
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the gains through broad-based stock-option plans. But the use of stock options as a mode 
of compensation means that the realization of gains depends on selling, not holding, 
ownership stakes. Moreover, in an exploding stock market as occurred in the Internet 
boom of 1996-2000, the returns to option holders reflect gains from speculation much 
more than gains from innovation. Furthermore, even in the tight labor markets of the 
Internet boom, high-tech employees who could potentially reap large gains from the 
exercise of stock options were also vulnerable to being thrown out of work through 
marketization and globalization (Lazonick 2009a and 2009c).  
 
As we have seen, in the 2000s up to the financial crisis of 2008, it was manipulation 
much more than innovation or speculation that drove stock prices. Through the 
escalation of stock buybacks from 2003 to 2007, the S&P 500 Index peaked in 2007 at a 
higher level than that achieved through the often wildly speculative stock valuations of 
2000. During 2003-2007 major U.S. companies used escalating stock buybacks to 
compete with one another to boost their stock prices and manage quarterly EPS. In the 
Great Recession of 2008-2009 stock prices tumbled as did stock buybacks. By 2010 U.S. 
companies were profitable again, but they both increased buybacks and still sat on huge 
cash reserves. In some cases companies even augmented these reserves by borrowing 
money at very low interest rates while they kept cash offshore to avoid taxation, 
preparing themselves for a renewed competitive escalation of buyback activity 
(Lazonick 2012a).  
 
The evolution of Wall Street into a gambling casino brought us the Great Recession. The 
subsequent recovery, which at the time of writing in October 2012 remains essentially 
“jobless”, has been the result of the continued domination of MSV ideology and practice 
in the U.S. industrial corporation. Until U.S. policy-makers address the problem of the 
financialization of corporate resource allocation, the achievement of equitable and stable 
economic growth will elude the United States. 
 
The policy agenda for sustainable prosperity must include five major reforms: 
 
1) Banning of stock repurchases by established U.S. corporations so corporate 
financial resources that could be allocated to innovation and job creation are not 
wasted for the purpose of manipulating companies’ stock prices. Once one rejects 
the flawed ideology that for the sake of superior economic performance, 
corporations should be run to maximize shareholder value, it follows that stock 
repurchases by established corporations serve no legitimate economic purpose. 
Moreover, executives who can think of no better way to allocate corporate resources 
should not be running the nation’s corporations. Instead of being used to prop up 
stock prices, these funds can be a) invested in innovation in areas in which the 
company has competence, b) invested in new ventures and spinoffs that draw upon 
the knowledge and experience of corporate employees, c) returned to employees in 
the form of higher wages and benefits, d) returned to local, state, and national 
governments that have supported the growth of the company, and/or e) returned to 
shareholders in the form of dividends, if such distributions are consistent with 
equitable and stable economic growth. 
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2) Indexing of employee stock options to an indicator of innovative performance so that 
executives cannot gain from speculation in and manipulation of their companies’ 
stock prices. It is generally accepted, by both proponents and opponents of 
shareholder-value ideology, that corporate executives in the United States have 
developed an obsession with meeting Wall Street’s expectations for quarterly EPS 
targets. It is also generally the case that in their resource allocation, people will 
respond to financial incentives, especially when the society deems those financial 
incentives as not only legitimate but also consistent with the common good. 
Remuneration in the form of unindexed stock options that can be sold as soon as 
they are exercised gives the U.S. corporate executive a strong incentive to make 
allocative decisions that result in speculation in and manipulation of his or her 
company’s stock price. Shareholder-value ideology legitimizes both stock buybacks 
and stock-based remuneration. Regulations that tie stock-based compensation to 
gains from innovation and exclude gains from speculation and manipulation are 
required to remove this perverse incentive. Indeed, it may make sense to get rid of 
stock-based compensation altogether. 
 
3)  Regulation of the employment contract to ensure that workers who contribute to the 
innovation process share in the gains to innovation. It is inherent in the innovation 
process that investments of productive resources, including the application of the 
skills and efforts of workers, are made today with the expectation of financial returns 
on these investments in the future. Workers, financiers, and taxpayers who 
contribute their labor and capital to the innovation process have a legitimate claim to 
an equitable share in the gains to innovation if and when they occur. Since 
innovation is a collective, cumulative, and uncertain process, it follows that the 
incentives of workers to contribute their skills and efforts to innovation depend on 
their expectations that these future returns will be forthcoming. At the same time, 
however, for these returns to be in fact equitable, they cannot be treated as an 
entitlement of employment. A “theory of innovative enterprise” is an essential 
intellectual foundation for the intelligent regulation of the employment contract so it 
is based on norms of distribution of the gains from innovative enterprise that are 
consistent with equitable and stable economic growth. 
 
4) Creation of work programs that make productive use of and enhance the productive 
capabilities of educated and experienced workers whose human capital would 
otherwise deteriorate through lack of other relevant employment.  Although there is 
little in the way of systematic evidence on the subject, there is no doubt that the 
combination of marketization and globalization has resulted in the displacement of 
large numbers of well-educated and highly experienced workers. The accumulated 
human capital of these workers, many of them in their 40s and 50s, will obsolesce 
unless they are quickly reemployed in jobs that can make use of it. Such a 
diminution in the stock of highly qualified human capital poses a high cost not only 
to the individuals concerned.  Society also loses because, to some extent, it has 
subsidized the investment in this human capital with the expectation of benefiting 
from its productive use. New employment opportunities may be created in the 
business sector or the government sector.  Either way, effective programs will 
require business-government collaboration to maintain and enhance the capabilities 
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of workers so that they can make productive contributions to the economy and earn 
decent incomes for themselves. 
 
 5) Implementation of taxes on the gains from innovation to fund those government 
agencies that need to invest in the public knowledge base required for the next round 
of innovation. The prevailing ideology that the free operation of markets tends to 
result in superior economic performance ignores two organizations that ivest in 
economic growth. First, it ignores the role of the innovative enterprise in generating 
higher quality, lower cost products. Second, it ignores the role of the developmental 
state in investing in knowledge bases and physical infrastructures that support the 
innovation process. MSV ideology appropriates for shareholders the returns to 
innovation that should go not only to employees but also to taxpayers. 
Notwithstanding the dominance of an ideology that says that the government should 
play little if any role in the allocation of productive resources, over the course of the 
twentieth century the U.S. government was the most formidable “developmental 
state” in history. In every high-tech field in which the United States has been a 
leader, it has been the result of a combination of resource allocation by the 
innovative enterprise and the developmental state (Lazonick 2011c). 
 
It will be impossible to justify these reforms if Americans do not question the ideology 
that companies should be run to “maximize shareholder value”. It is an ideology that 
results in inequity and instability and that ultimately undermines the productive 
foundations of economic growth. While MSV has currency throughout the world, its 
pervasive and unquestioned acceptance has become an almost uniquely American 
phenomenon. Even in the United States, it was an ideology with which the economy 
could do without until the 1980s – which is when the trends to permanent job 
displacement and income inequality set in. The United States is engaged in global 
competition with highly innovative national economies in which MSV ideology does not 
hold sway. As long as this destructive ideology governs U.S. corporate resource 
allocation, the U.S. economy will remain incapable of generating middle-class jobs on 
the scale that is needed to restore sustainable prosperity.   
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APPENDIX: 50 biggest stock repurchasers, 2001-2010 
 
Industry color codes: 
 
RP 
rank Company Name 
Fortune 
rank 
2010 
Repurchases 
2001-2010,  
$b. 
RP/NI
% 
DV/NI
% 
R&D% 
SALES 
RP/ 
R&D 
1 EXXON MOBIL 2 174.5 62 26 0.3 22.8 
2 MICROSOFT 38 110.0 89 49 15.2 1.6 
3 IBM 18 89.2 91 18 5.7 1.7 
4 CISCO SYSTEMS 62 65.0 130 0 14.8 1.5 
5 PROCTER & GAMBLE 26 57.0 72 44 3.1 3.0 
6 HEWLETT-PACKARD 11 54.0 116 18 3.8 1.6 
7 WAL-MART STORES 1 52.6 46 24 0.0 nm 
8 BANK OF AMERICA 9 52.1 51 63 0.0 nm 
9 PFIZER 31 50.6 62 68 17.1 0.6 
10 GENERAL ELECTRIC 6 48.5 29 52 1.9 1.7 
11 INTEL 56 48.3 81 32 15.0 0.9 
12 JOHNSON & JOHNSON 40 37.3 38 40 12.4 0.6 
13 GOLDMAN SACHS 54 35.8 57 13 0.0 nm 
14 CITIGROUP 14 32.2 38 72 0.0 nm 
15 HOME DEPOT 30 30.9 75 27 0.0 nm 
16 DELL 41 29.5 119 0 1.0 5.8 
17 PEPSICO 43 28.8 62 39 0.7 11.3 
18 AMGEN 163 28.8 105 0 25.1 1.0 
19 TIME WARNER 95 28.7 -73 -13 0.3 28.2 
20 UNITEDHEALTH GROUP 22 26.5 88 2 0.0 nm 
21 CHEVRON 3 26.0 20 32 0.3 6.2 
22 AT&T 12 25.5 27 68 0.6 5.2 
23 DISNEY 55 24.9 90 19 0.0 nm 
24 ORACLE 96 22.4 52 5 12.4 1.0 
25 CONOCOPHILLIPS 4 22.0 40 34 0.1 13.0 
26 WELLS FARGO 23 21.9 29 41 0.0 nm 
27 WELLPOINT 42 21.9 101 0 0.0 0.0 
28 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 175 21.7 129 18 15.6 1.2 
29 MCDONALD'S 111 20.3 72 43 0.0 nm 
30 JPMORGAN CHASE 13 20.1 24 45 0.0 nm 
31 AMERICAN EXPRESS 91 17.1 56 21 0.0 nm 
32 UPS 48 16.9 58 51 0.0 nm 
33 MERCK 53 16.8 27 56 15.3 0.4 
34 COCA-COLA 70 16.0 28 49 0.0 nm 
35 MORGAN STANLEY 63 16.0 41 31 0.0 nm 
36 ALTRIA GROUP 154 15.8 19 62 1.2 2.6 
37 3M 97 15.2 49 41 5.9 1.2 
38 DIRECTV GROUP 110 15.0 258 2 0.2 53.5 
39 TRAVELERS COS 106 14.8 60 44 0.0 nm 
40 CBS 174 14.7 -52 -12 0.0 nm 
41 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 44 14.4 42 26 3.3 1.0 
42 LOCKHEED MARTIN 52 14.0 73 28 2.6 1.9 
43 COMCAST 66 13.9 83 14 0.0 nm 
44 BOEING 36 13.5 57 37 5.2 0.4 
45 PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL 65 13.1 73 19 0.0 nm 
46 AETNA 77 12.0 102 1 0.0 nm 
47 ALLSTATE 89 12.0 60 35 0.0 nm 
48 TARGET 33 11.6 52 16 0.0 nm 
49 U S BANCORP 126 11.2 32 54 0.0 nm 
50 MEDTRONIC 160 10.9 49 25 11.2 0.8 
RP= repurchases of common stock; DV=cash dividends; NI=net income; R&D=research and development expenditures 
nm=not meaningful because of zero R&D expenditures. 
Sources: Compustat database, corrected from company 10-K filings. 
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